The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance by Loewenstein, Mark J.
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
1994 
The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance 
Mark J. Loewenstein 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, Securities Law 
Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Citation Information 
Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45 ALA. L. REV. 783 (1994), 
available at https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/772. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
Citation: 45 Ala. L. Rev. 783 1993-1994 
Provided by: 
William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Fri Jul 14 15:34:37 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information




As the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Com-
mission) looks to the future and contemplates the unknown, it
can be comforted, or disturbed, that one of the thorniest issues
of the past will remain on its agenda--corporate governance.'
Whether and how to influence corporate governance is some-
thing that the Commission has grappled with many times in the
past2 and without much success? Because it lacks the authority
to promulgate rules or regulations directly affecting corporate
governance,4 the Commission has moved cautiously, requiring
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1. As this symposium focuses on the Securities and Exchange Commission,
which has little concern with closely held corporations, this Article will corre-
spondingly focus on large, publicly held corporations. In this regard, "corporate
governance" refers to the mechanisms, both legal and practical, that regulate the
relationship between and among the management of a corporation (its senior execu-
tive officers), the board of directors, and the shareholders. See generally MELVIN A.
EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 1 (1976) (discussing the legal role
and rights of shareholders).
That corporate governance remains on the Commission's agenda was confirmed
by its new chairman, Arthur Levitt, Jr., who so testified before the Senate Sub-
committee shortly after his confirmation, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1567, at 7
(Aug. 4, 1993), and by SEC Commissioner Roberts in remarks to the Association of
Publicly Traded Companies, see Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1560, at 7 (July 16,
1993).
2. For example, the Commission tried to address the abuse, adopted by some
companies, of disenfranchising threatening shareholders through plans that resulted
in differentiated voting rights. The Commission's one-share, one-vote rule did not
survive in the courts. See infra text accompanying notes 81-88.
3. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
4. See Santa Fe -Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472-73 (1977);
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enhanced disclosure that might result in substantive changes in
the way corporations are governed.
The Commission's cautious approach has left it behind a
growing movement of academicians,5 prominent lawyers,6 and
others7 who are increasingly calling for change, sometimes radi-
cal change,8 in corporate governance. There is, of course, a ques-
tion of whether this cadre of would-be reformers is correct in its
assessment that change is necessary, a question that is ad-
dressed below.9 But, assuming that these critics are right that
change is necessary, another question arises-what role, if any,
should the Commission play?
It is the thesis of this Article that change is necessary in the
way corporations are governed and that the Commission should
be an active player in bringing about reform. More specifically,
the Commission should play a role in solidifying what has come
to be regarded as an essential element to effective corporate
governance-an independent board of directors. I propose that
the Securities Act of 1933 be amended to authorize the Commis-
sion to condition the availability of certain simplified methods of
issuing securities under the Act on the existence of an indepen-
dent board.' ° The Commission should also be empowered to
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 412-13 (D.C. Cir. 1990). See generally
Philip C. Berg, The Limits of SEC Authority Under Section 14(a) of the Exchange
Act: Where Federal Disclosure Ends and State Corporate Governance Begins, 17 J.
CORP. L. 311 (1992) (all noting the statutory limits on the SEC's authority).
5. See JAY W. LORSCH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S
CORPORATE BOARDS (1989); LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET
(1988); Mark J. Loewenstein, Making America Competitive, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 453
(1993).
6. See Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance, The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187 (1991)
(proposing the replacement of annual director elections with quinquennial elections).
7. See MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA: THE CAUSES AND CURES OF
OUR BUSINESS MYOPIA (1991) (proposing various solutions).
8. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45
VAND. L. REV. 1263 (1992) (arguing for recasting the board of directors as a self-
perpetuating body whose role is limited to broad financial and structural matters,
while senior management has full operational control); Marleen A. O'Connor, The
Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Manage-
ment Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899 (1993) (proposing increased worker in-
volvement in corporate governance).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 104-14.
10. For instance, the use of Form S-3, a simplified form for the registration of
securities, and rule 415, allowing for "shelf registration" of securities, are available
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adopt rules and regulations defining what constitutes an inde-
pendent board for these purposes.
This is both a modest and radical proposal. Few in corporate
America would dispute either the efficacy or the importance of
an independent board of directors to monitor senior manage-
ment." Evidence of failure in corporate boardrooms is readily
apparent. The going-private scandals, foreign corrupt payments,
and illegal campaign contributions of the 1970s; abusive tender
offer defenses and management-led leveraged buy-outs of the
1980s; and the executive pay fiasco and corporation failures of
the 1990s all point to such a failure. Improving the board, mak-
ing it more professional and a real source of oversight, is a goal
many have espoused.'2 But no real reformation is possible un-
less the board is sufficiently independent of management to
adopt changes. A board would be hard-pressed to adopt any pro-
posal that significantly altered its relationship with manage-
ment unless it had a degree of independence from management.
What this proposal does is simply create a climate that would
permit other, possibly more meaningful, reforms. In that respect,
the proposal is a modest one.
But it is also radical because even indirect Commission
involvement in corporate governance is much feared in the busi-
ness community, in the same way that the established medical
community opposed Medicare when it was first proposed."3 It
only to issuers who meet certain tests. The Commission could be empowered to
further condition the availability of these provisions to registrants that meet certain
defined corporate governance standards.
11. A report of the SEC staff so concluded in 1980: "The board of directors has
come to be viewed by many as the center of efforts to enhance corporate account-
ability. With an increased number of truly independent directors and an effectively
functioning committee system, an institutionalized process for holding management
accountable will be created." STAFF OF SEC, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON
CORPORATE AcCOUNTABILTY, PRINTED FOR USE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING,
HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS 579 (Sept. 4, 1980). The Business Roundtable, a natural
opponent of the Commission's staff, has concurred in the value of independent
directors. The Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of
Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 BUS. LAW. 2083, 2105-08
(1978) [hereinafter The Composition of Boards].
12. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 1; LOWENSTEIN, supra note 5; JACOBS, supra
note 7.
13. Business leaders object to SEC meddling in corporate governance because of
the perceived need to separate political and economic power. See, e.g., The Com-
position of Boards, supra note 11, at 2105-08; Roberta S. Karmel, Is It Time for a
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was not so much the underlying policy that doctors feared; rath-
er it was a suspicion that Medicare would somehow result in
socialized medicine that drove the opposition. Similarly, the
business community might oppose this sort of Commission in-
volvement, not because an independent board of directors is
necessarily objectionable, but rather because Commission au-
thority to act in this area would be viewed as impermissible
governmental interference in the free market.'4
But this opposition would be misplaced. Much of the current
dissatisfaction with corporate governance stems from the obser-
vation that senior management lacks accountability because the
board of directors, which should monitor management, has been
co-opted by it. The appearance of co-option, if not the reality,
would be far less prevalent if the board were truly independent
of management. And, while many corporations are moving to-
ward more independent boards, the degree of independence
varies. It is still the norm to have significant representation of
senior management on the board and for the corporation's chief
executive to be the chairman of the board of directors. The chief
executive also is influential in the selection of new board mem-
bers, who thus are somewhat beholden for their selection to the
CEO.'5
This proposal, and in particular the idea that the Commis-
sion ought to take a more direct role in corporate governance, is
prompted by the observation that the accountability of corporate
boards to the shareholders has declined in recent years, and the
sources for reform have been stifled in their ability to make an
impact. I will explore each of these phenomena in turn.
II. THE DECLINE OF CORPORATE AccouNTABILrrY
The regulation of the internal affairs of American business
corporations and, thus, corporate governance, has largely and
traditionally been a function of state law." A widely recognized
Federal Corporation Law?, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 60 (1991).
14. Karmel, supra note 13, at 60.
15. See LORSCH, supra note 5, at 184-87.
16. See authorities cited in Philip C. Berg, The Limits of SEC Authority Under
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act: Where Federal Disclosure Ends and State Corpo-
rate Governance Begins, 17 J. CORP. L. 311, 313 n.13 (1992).
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conflict-of-laws principle establishes that the law of the
corporation's state of incorporation is the governing law for that
corporation.17 As more than fifty percent of the Fortune 500
companies are incorporated in the State of Delaware, its cor-
porate code is a prime source for what state law provides with
respect to corporate governance. But even if Delaware were not
such a popular domicile for American corporations, its code
would be a fair proxy for the law of corporate governance, as
state law does not vary significantly on questions of corporate
governance. As we shall see, state law has taken a minimalist
approach to corporate governance, and neither shareholders nor
the federal government has filled the gap."
A The Role of the States
Virtually all states provide that the business and affairs of
corporations shall be managed by, or managed under the direc-
tion of, a board of directors, 9 and that directors are elected to
office by the shareholders at an annual meeting.'s Insofar as
corporate governance is concerned, that is about all state corpo-
ration statutes say.2' State law does not, for the most part, ad-
.dress whether directors, or any portion of the board of directors,
17. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICTS § 302 (1971).
18. The national securities exchanges and the National Association of Securities
Dealers have the authority to adopt corporate governance standards for securities
traded on the national exchanges and the NASDAQ National Market System, respec-
tively. But this authority has been exercised sparingly and usually at the behest of
the Commission. With the decision of Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406
(D.C. Cir. 1990), see infra text accompanying notes 81-88, the Commission certainly
will be less active in this area in the absence of new legislation authorizing its in-
volvement. See Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance
Listing Standards Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 Bus. LAW. 1461 (1992).
19. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
(RMBCA) § 8.01 (1984); MODEL BusINESS CORP. AT § 35 (1979).
20. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1991); RMBCA § 8.03(d) (1984).
21. Some provisions, such as those granting shareholders preemptive rights to
acquire newly issued shares and mandating cumulative voting, might also be thought
of as corporate governance provisions, as they protect the right of minority
shareholders to elect directors. Interestingly, and consistent with the thesis of this
Article, recent changes in corporation law largely have eliminated these provisions.
See Douglas M. Branson, Recent Changes to the Model Business Corporation Act:
Death Knells for Main Street Corporation Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 258, 263-65 (1993).
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must be independent of management; whether corporate boards
may have advisory committees of shareholders; who can nomi-
nate directors;' who can have access to the corporate proxy
statement;' what qualifications (beyond a minimum age) a
nominee for the board of directors must possess; or who can
serve as chair of the board of directors, to name a few of the
issues that concern reformers. In short, state law is silent on the
critical questions that determine the quality of the board of
directors and the structural relationship between the board and
the management of the corporation.'
Instead of specific statutory provisions designed to assure
proper monitoring of corporate management by the board of
directors, state law relies, for the most part, on two principles:
First, that directors are fiduciaries and, as such, they can be
held accountable to the shareholders if they fail properly to
discharge their fiduciary duties; and second, shareholders have
the power to replace directors and enact provisions in the bylaws
or the articles of incorporation that detail the sort of governance
they desire.' In theory, this is a legitimate approach to the
22. In theory, as shareholders have the right to elect directors, they must have
the right to nominate them as well. While state corporation statutes make the
former explicit, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1991), the latter is left to implica-
tion. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 1489, 1505 (1970) ("As a corollary to their exclusive right to elect the board,
the shareholders have the right to nominate candidates for directorships."). But, as a
practical matter, the right to nominate directors is of little value unless the share-
holders have access to the corporation's proxy statement. By contrast, no statute
gives directors or the incumbent board of directors the authority to nominate direc-
tors. Yet because the board controls the corporate proxy statement, it, again as a
practical matter, has the exclusive right to nominate directors.
23. See Eisenberg, supra note 22, at 1492 ("[Sltate corporate statutes do not
even recognize the existence of proxy solicitation, let alone regulate it."). In publicly
held companies, shareholders elect directors by proxy, figuratively and literally.
Because of the large number of shareholders and the fact that they are widely
dispersed, the "annual meeting" merely serves as a place where the results of the
corporation's proxy solicitation are announced.
24. This laissez-faire philosophy is frequently the target of criticism. See, e.g.,
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy
Toward Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071 (1990) (arguing for state law changes
that would level the playing field for proxy contests between management and in-
surgente).
25. But if the shareholders attempt to amend the bylaws to alter the gover-
nance structure, the board may adopt an adversarial position. For instance, when
the shareholders of Pennzoil Corporation sought to amend the bylaws to create a
708 [Vol. 45:3:783
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question of corporate governance. In practice, however, this
approach has proven to be less than ideal. The directors' fiducia-
ry duties of loyalty and care have been seriously eroded by a
number of recent developments at the state level. The costs to
shareholders of nominating and electing directors of their own
choosing (that is to say, not nominated by the board itself) are
prohibitive, or nearly so. And the possibility of shareholder ac-
tion on issues of corporate governance, while more likely now
than at any time in the past, is still not a promising avenue for
reform in corporate governance.
B. Fiduciary Duties Under Attack
1. Duty of Loyalty.-The duty of loyalty has been a casualty
of the tender offer phenomenon of the 1980s. As more and more
corporations became the targets of hostile tender offers during
the 1980s, those on the sidelines searched for ways to avoid the
same fate. Among the many tactics and solutions that emerged,
three are noted here-poison pills, antitakeover legislation, and
nonshareholder constituency statutes. These three are chosen
because of their effectiveness as antitakeover measures, their ef-
fect on corporate governance, and their- effect on the duty of
loyalty.
a. Poison Pills
Poison pills first appeared on the corporate scene in the
early 1980s as a way to deter hostile takeovers. Simply put, a
poison pill is a right distributed to corporate shareholders enti-
tling them to buy the corporation's stock at a large discount to
market (generally fifty percent) if a third party acquires a cer-
tain percent (generally fifteen percent to twenty percent) of the
corporation's voting securities.' This obviously creates a strong
shareholder advisory committee, the Pennzoil board, as have other boards in other
such attempts, opposed the shareholders vigorously. For an account of the matter,
see Charles F. Richards, Jr. & Anne C. Foster, Exxon Revisited: The SEC Allows
Pennzoil to Exclude Both Mandatory and Precatoy Proposals Seeking to Create a
Shareholder Advisory Committee, 48 Bus. LAW. 1509 (1993).
26. For a complete discussion of takeover defenses, see ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR.
ET AL., TA EOVER DEFENSE (4th ed. 1990) (three volume treatise).
27. The "flip-in3 feature of a poison pill is described in the text. For a detailed
description of poison pills, see JoY M. BRYAN, CORPORATE ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES:
1994] 789
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disincentive to acquire the stock of such a corporation without
the consent of its board, which generally retains the right to
redeem "the pill" from its shareholders for a nominal price (pro-
vided that the pill has not already been "triggered" by an imper-
missible acquisition). The poison pill has gained widespread
acceptance in America's boardrooms's and approval in our
courts.'
From a practical perspective, the presence of a poison pill in
a corporation's capital structure means that someone seeking to
take over that corporation must deal with the board of directors.
No bidder has proceeded, or indeed can proceed, with a tender
offer in the face of a poison pill, because, if the pill is triggered,
the resulting dilution is too great a cost for any bidder to
bear." The enhanced power of the board of directors, in turn,
means that the market for corporate control is less perfect, that
a poor performing board of directors faces less discipline from
the market place." Although the poison pill does not preclude a
THE POISON PILL DEvICE (1992); 1 FLEISCHER ET AL., supra note 26, at 209-428; LEO
HERZEL & RICHARD W. SHEPRO, BIDDERS AND TARGETS: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
IN THE U.S. 76-84 (1990); MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS &
FREEZEOUTS § 6.03[4] (1992).
28. According to Lipton and Steinberger, by the end of 1990, over 1500 compa-
nies had adopted poison pills, including 52% of the Business Week 1000 companies,
56% of the Fortune 500 companies, and 68% of the Fortune 200 companies. LIPTON
& STEINBERGER, supra note 27, § 6.03[4][a), at 6-59.
29. The leading case is Moran v. Household Intl, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.
1985) in which the Delaware Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, upheld
the validity of the poison pill against a shareholder challenge. Subsequent cases
upheld the validity of the pill against challenge by potential acquirers as well. See,
e.g., CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Grand
Metro. Pub., Ltd. v. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
30. FLEISCHER ET AL., supra note 26, at 222-23.
31. The notion that there is a market for corporate control and that this market
serves as a potential constraint on inefficient management is often traced back to
Henry Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965). Proceeding from this thesis, some scholars have argued that target manage-
ment should remain passive when faced with a tender offer: passivity reduces the
"cost" of tender offers, increasing their likelihood and effectiveness, to the benefit of
shareholders as a class. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role
of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161
(1981). While the work of Easterbrook and Fischel has not been uniformly embraced,
see, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical
Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1145 (1984); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to
Easterbrook & Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (1980), it is fairly well accepted that
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change of control,32 it clearly deters hostile tender offers and
has the effect of reducing the board's accountability.
b. State Antitakeover Legislation
Like poison pills, antitakeover legislation, adopted in many
states, also has had the effect of insulating corporate boards
from the market for corporate control. While state antitakeover
legislation predated the tender offer boom of the 1980s, the
legality of much of this legislation was in doubt until the United
States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Indiana's
"control share" statute in 1987.' Following the Court's decision,
a number of states, including Delaware, adopted new laws to
protect local businesses from unwanted takeovers.'
Delaware's statute is not a particularly protective statute,
but nonetheless significantly enhances the power of the board of
directors in relation to the hostile bidder. Under the Delaware
provision, persons who own more than fifteen percent of the
outstanding stock of a Delaware corporation must wait three
years after reaching the fifteen percent threshold before engag-
ing in a "business combination" (which is broadly defined) with
the corporation. While there are exceptions to the waiting peri-
od,' the overall effect of the statute is similar to a poison pill:
bidders are encouraged to negotiate with the target's board and
the hostile tender offer plays, or at least could play, an important role in the
market for corporate control and that allowing management unfettered discretion to
defeat a hostile tender offer is both unwise as a matter of economic policy and
unacceptable as a matter of corporate law. See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership
v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 799, 800 (1988) ("To acknowledge that directors may
employ... 'poison pills' to deprive shareholders of the ability effectively to choose
to accept a noncoercive offer, after the board has had a reasonable opportunity to
explore or create alternatives, or attempt to negotiate on the shareholders' behalf,
would, it seems to me, be so inconsistent with widely shared notions of appropriate
corporate governance as to threaten to diminish the legitimacy and the authority of
our corporation law."). See generally Mark J. Loewenstein, Toward an Auction
Market for Corporate Control and the Demise of the Business Judgment Rule, 63 S.
CAL. L. REV. 65 (1989) (discussing changes in the law of tender offers).
32. FLEIScHER ET AL, supra note 26, at 224-27.
33. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987). The Court created
the doubt about the constitutionality of state antitakeover legislation with its 1982
decision in Edgar v. Mite, 457 U.S. 624 (1982), where it held that the Illinois
Business Takeover Act violated the commerce clause. See FLEISCHER ET AL., supra
note 26, at 136-39.
34. Delaware's statute is included as part of its corporation code. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1991).
35. Id. § 203(a).
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deterred from launching a bid in the first instance. And like the
poison pill, state takeover statutes put a barrier between corpo-
rate boards and the market for corporate control.
c. Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes
While poison pills and antitakeover legislation have indi-
rectly loosened the bonds between shareholders and directors,
the "nonshareholder constituency" statutes have accomplished
the same end directly. These statutes permit, and in some in-
stances direct the board, when faced with a potential change of
control of the corporation, to take into account the effects of its
decision on the interests of the corporation's employees, suppli-
ers, customers, and communities served.'
These statutes thus directly dilute the board's accountability
to the shareholders. Decisions which cannot be justified as being
in the interests of the corporation's shareholders, may be justi-
fied as being in the interests of some other constituency, say
some community in which the corporation maintains a plant.
When directors are accountable to constituencies with conflicting
36. More than one-half of the states have adopted such statutes. For a compi-
lation and comparison of these statutes, see Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper In-
terpretation of Corporate Constituency Statutes and the Formulation of Director Du-
ties, 21 STETSON L. REv. 163, 194-96 (1991).
By way of example, the Pennsylvania statute provides, in relevant part:
In discharging the duties of their respective positions, the board of direc-
tors . . . may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider to
the extent they deem appropriate:
(1) The effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by such action,
including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and creditors of the
corporation, and upon communities in which offices or other establishments of
the corporation are located.
15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1715 (1993).
The Connecticut statute mandates that directors consider constituencies other
than shareholders. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-313 (West Supp. 1993). See
FLEISCHER ET AL., supra note 26, at 180-85; Robert M. Hart & Carol M. Degener,
Non-Stockholder Constituency Statutes, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 12, 1990, at 1; Symposium:
Corporate Malaise-Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STETSON L. REV. 1-244
(1991).
Delaware has not enacted "other constituency" legislation, but Delaware case
law gives directors some latitude to consider the effects of their decision on
nonshareholder constituencies. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,
571 A-2d 1140 (Del. 1990); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261
(Del. 1988); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.




interests, they become accountable to no one.
In sum, these developments, which protect corporations
from hostile tender offers, have had the effect of reducing the
accountability of corporate boards to their shareholders. More-
over, these developments have seriously undercut the fiduciary
duty of loyalty. Antitakeover laws and nonshareholder constitu-
ency statutes make it much harder for shareholders to prove
that directors acted to protect their positions as directors or out
of loyalty to management. Indeed, the whole notion that direc-
tors owe a high degree of loyalty to shareholders has been erod-
ed by these developments.
2. Duty of Care.-The duty of care also was eroded during
this period, but for an entirely different reason. In 1985, the
Delaware Supreme Court decided the case of Smith v. Van
Gorkom, s and thereby focused the attention of the corporate
bar on the duty of care. Van Gorkom involved a friendly, maybe
too friendly, takeover. It was so friendly, in fact, that the direc-
tors of the acquired company, Trans Union, felt they needed
little time to review the $700 million offer for the company.
Some Trans Union shareholders, however, had a different view
of the matter, believing the company was worth more than the
board had agreed to sell it for and, in any event, the board spent
so little time reviewing the deal that they could not have known
whether the price was fair. The shareholders found a sympathet-
ic ear in the Supreme Court of Delaware.
In a lengthy opinion, the Delaware Court determined that
the directors breached their duty of care to the corporation: they
treated the deal in too cavalier a fashion.39 There were a num-
ber of things that the board could have done, but did not do.'
37. "A manager responsible to two conflicting interests is in fact answerable to
neither." Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 31, at 1192. This proposition, sensible as
it seems, is not without its critics. Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and
Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 121, 158 (1991) ("That is a fine aphorism, but it
is neither law nor fact."). For a thoughtful economic analysis of such statutes, see
Jonathan I. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L.
RE-v. 23 (1991).
38. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
39. Van Gorkom, 488 A-2d at 881.
40. Among other failings, the directors did not receive or review a written
summary of the terms of the merger, they did not receive or review documentation
1994] 793
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The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the Trans
Union board was a blue ribbon panel of sorts-prominent busi-
ness people, academics, public figures.4' And, to add insult to
injury, the court held the directors would be personally liable to
the shareholders for the damage caused.' This holding was
remarkable as the conventional wisdom had been that absent
extraordinary circumstances, directors would not be personally
liable for breach of the duty of care.'
While the merits of the court's legal and factual analysis
has been debated,' the corporate bar quickly moved beyond the
case to a more friendly arena, the Delaware legislature. In 1986,
Delaware passed a statute that, in effect, provided a means by
which directors could avoid monetary liability for breaching
their duty of care,' and a number of other states quickly fol-
lowed suit.' The unintended consequence of Smith v. Van
Gorkom, then, was to erode the duty of care.
Combined with the defensive maneuvers to hostile takeovers
to support the adequacy of the price offered; they made no attempt "to value the
entire enterprise"; they did not request the company's chief financial officer to make
a valuation study of adequacy of the price offered; they failed to ask probing
questions about the deal and the manner in which the price was determined; they
raised no questions as to the tax implications of a cash-out merger; etc. Id. at 874.
41. Id. at 894 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 864.
43. This wisdom is based on a 1968 article by Professor Joseph W. Bishop, Jr.,
Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078 (1968). This Article has been frequently
cited for this observation: 'The search for cases in which directors of industrial
corporations have been held liable in derivative suits for negligence uncomplicated by
self-dealing is a search for a very small number of needles in a very large hay-
stack." Id. at 1099.
44. Two justices dissented from the result in Van Gorkom. Following the de-
cision, a number of critical articles were published. See, e.g., Bayless Manning, Re-
flections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 BUS.
LAW. 1 (1985).
45. Delaware law permits a corporation to include, in its certificate of incorpora-
tion,
[a] provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of (the] fidu-
ciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or
limit the liability of a director . . . [for breach of the duty of loyalty and cer-
tain other exceptions].
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(bX7) (1991).




approved by the courts and the legislatures, fiduciary duties of
directors were different in the late 1980s than they were at the
beginning of that decade." Consequently, one of the two ratio-
nales that might justify the "hands off" approach of state legisla-
tures in the area of corporate governance was much less persua-
sive. The second rationale, shareholder activism, never a factor
before the 1980s, has proven to hold some promise for reform,
but probably not enough.
C. The Unrealizable Promise of Shareholder Activism
Under typical state corporation statutes, shareholders have
the right to amend the bylaws of the corporation," and the by-
laws can say a great deal about the way in which the corpora-
tion is governed. This state law right fits nicely with rule 14a-8
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,"9 which assures share-
holders some access to the corporate proxy statement. Thus, a
shareholder could propose, for instance, that the bylaws be
amended to provide that only persons who are independent of
management of the corporation are eligible to serve as directors
of the corporation. But the likelihood is remote that such a by-
law amendment, or any shareholder-proposed bylaw amendment
for that matter, would be adopted because of the obstacles that
shareholders face in a rule 14a-8 proposal.
As a preliminary matter, the corporation's board of directors
is unlikely to look kindly on any proposal that affects its own
composition, particularly if one or more of the current board
would be rendered ineligible to serve if the proposal were adopt-
ed. This potential hostility can manifest itself initially in a re-
47. The 1984 Revised Model Business Corporation Act, in contrast to earlier ver-
sions of the Model Business Corporation Act, also has diluted traditional notions of
fiduciary duty. See Branson, supra note 21, at 270-72; Marc I. Steinberg, The Evis-
ceration of the Duty of Care, 42 SW. L.J. 919 (1988) (commenting on the state
statutory law developments that have reduced the duty of care).
48. Delaware Corporation Code § 109(a) provides that stockholders have the
right to amend the bylaws to the exclusion of the board of directors, unless the cer-
tificate of incorporation confers that power on the directors as well. DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 109(a) (1991). Section 10.20 of the RMBCA empowers both the board and
the shareholders to amend the bylaws, unless the articles reserve that power exclu-
sively to the shareholders.
49. See 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1988).
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quest to the Commission for permission to exclude the propos-
al.' The possibility that the board will find a basis to exclude
the proposal is real: rule 14a-8 includes thirteen categories of
proposals that may be excluded from a proxy statement."'
One of these categories, that the corporation may omit a
proposal if it relates to "an election to office,"52 has proven to be
an obstacle to corporate governance reform. Mobil Oil cited this
provision as the basis for excluding a shareholder proposal that
would have disqualified citizens of countries belonging to OPEC
from serving on Mobil's board of directors.' Mobil persuaded
the staff of the Commission and the federal courts that this
proposal, if adopted, would have precluded the reelection of
Suliman S. Olayan, a member of its board and a citizen of Saudi
Arabia. Therefore, the proposal was one related to an election
and thus excludable from the proxy statement.' Under similar
reasoning, a corporation could exclude shareholder proposals
that would adversely affect sitting members of its board.'
50. The practice of the SEC is to permit a registrant that desires to exclude a
shareholder proposal to request the staff of the Commission to issue a no-action
letter-that is, a letter assuring the registrant that if the proposal is omitted the
staff will not recommend to the Commission that action be taken against the regis-
trant as a result of the omission. If the letter is refused, the registrant might still
omit the proposal, risking enforcement action by the Commission, or private action
by the disappointed shareholder. The courts have recognized a private right of action
on the part of shareholders to enforce rule 14a-8. See Rauchman v. Mobil Corp., 739
F.2d 205, 207-08 (8th Cir. 1984).
The Board's resistance to shareholder proposals can result in lengthy and
costly battles for inclusion in the proxy statement. See, e.g., Richards & Foster,
supra note 25 (detailing the efforts of some Pennzoil shareholders who sought to
create a shareholder advisory committee).
51. Among the exclusions that have often tripped up shareholder proposals are:
o the proposal is not a proper subject of action by security holders
under the laws of the registrant's domicile;
o the proposal would violate applicable law or a Commission proxy rule
or regulation;
o the proposal relates to the conduct of the ordinary business operations
of the registrant; and
o the proposal relates to an election to office.
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-8(cXl), (2), (3), (7), (8) (1988).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(cX8) (1988).
53. Rauchman v. Mobil Corp., 739 F.2d 205, 206 (6th Cir. 1984).
54. Rauchman, 739 F.2d at 206.
55. See, e.g., CNA Financial Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 30767 (Jan.
5, 1983) (proposal calling for the election of a salaried, nonmanagement employee
excludable under rule 14a-8(cX8)).
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Even if a proposal is not caught by one of the thirteen exclu-
sions, significant obstacles lie in its path. While making a pro-
posal is relatively inexpensive,' a vigorous and expensive cam-
paign for its adoption seems to be indispensable. As a result of
the free-rider problem, a proposing shareholder has little incen-
tive to campaign for the proposal's adoption. Further, as in any
proxy contest, whether over the election of directors or the adop-
tion of a shareholder proposal, incumbent management has a
distinct advantage over outsiders. Many shareholders routinely
give proxies to the corporation's designated proxy voters. Of
those aware of shareholder proposals, a certain number will
support management's position because of some preexisting
relationship with management.57 Finally, and most important-
ly, management has access to the corporate treasury to fund its
opposition to such a proposal; it can solicit, on a basis that is es-
sentially cost-free to itself,,votes against the proposal, while the
proposing shareholders must fund, at their own expense, the
uphill battle it will take to achieve its adoption.' It is no won-
der, then, that shareholder proposals lacking the support of the
corporation's board of directors are rarely adopted pursuant to
rule 14a-8.59
Nevertheless, recent amendments to the Commission's proxy
rules,60 and increased activism by some of the nation's largest
56. To make a proposal, a shareholder need only (a) be a record or beneficial
holder of at least one percent or $1000 in market value of the registrant's securities,
and (b) submit the proposal and a supporting statement of no more than 500 words
to the registrant in a timely manner. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1988).
57. There is empirical evidence that the relationship of some institutional inves-
tors with management causes those investors to side with management. See James
A. Brickley et al., Ownership Structure and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments, 20
J. FiN. ECON. 267, 276-83 (1988). This would be reduced or eliminated if firms had
confidential voting.
58. Part of the expense the proponents of a rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal
must bear is the cost of compliance with the Commission proxy rules on filing and
delivery of proxy solicitations if the shareholder is seeking proxies. See JAMES D.
COX ET AL., SEcURrTiEs REG. 890 (1991).
59. See Patrick Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and
Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 120 (1988). By contrast, corporate man-
agement rarely loses when it makes a proposal to the shareholders. For instance,
data collected by the Investor Responsibility Research Center showed that for the
period September 1, 1985 to August 31, 1986, 390 companies submitted 578 different
antitakeover proposals to their shareholders, of which only 13 were defeated.
60. Regulation of Communication Among Shareholders, Securities Exchange Act
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institutional shareholders, might be a cause for mild optimism.
However, this optimism ought to be tempered by the evidence.
At the end of the 1980s, for instance, institutional shareholders
became disenchanted with poison pills and other corporate
antitakeover devices. These shareholders sponsored resolutions
at a number of companies to overturn these protections and, for
the most part, were unsuccessful. For instance, the most recent
comprehensive study available, compiled by the Investor Respon-
sibility Research Center, Inc. (IRRC), discloses that in 1990,
shareholders voted on an aggregate of 294 shareholder propos-
als, sixteen of which passed. Of these sixteen, nine were pro-
posed in connection with proxy contests. By contrast, manage-
ment submitted 1047 proposals to shareholders, and all but
twenty-two passed.6 '
The lack of success of shareholder-initiated proposals is
even more striking when the nature of the proposals is consid-
ered. In 1990, of forty-seven shareholder proposals to repeal
classified boards, none passed; of fifty shareholder proposals to
adopt cumulative voting, none passed; and of fifty-one proposals
to adopt confidential voting, only four passed. All but one of
those four proposals were submitted in connection with an orga-
nized proxy contest over the election of directors. 2 The only
sorts of shareholder proposals that met with any degree of suc-
cess were proposals to redeem poison pills, where nine of forty-
one proposals passed. Of those nine, however, three were related
to proxy contests. 63 Shareholder proposals in prior years fared
even worse.
Data from 1992 meetings, and preliminary data from 1993
annual meetings, both compiled by the IRRC, do not suggest
that the new proxy rules are resulting in dramatic changes. In
1992, only seven of 187 shareholder proposals received a majori-
ty of the votes cast, and only two passed. In 1993, preliminary
Release No. 34-31326, 1992 WL 301258 (Oct. 16, 1992), 17 C.F.R. Parts 240 and
241, effective Oct. 22, 1992. These new rules, among other things, allow shareholders
to communicate with one another and to lobby one another on voting, so long as
proxies are not solicited.
61. WILLIAM F. SANDER, SHAREHOLDER VOTING ALMANAC 3-5 (1991) (a publica-
tion of the Investor Responsibility Research Center, Inc. (IRRC)).




results indicate that eleven of 163 shareholder-initiated corpo-
rate governance proposals received a majority of the votes cast,
and six passed."
It may be the case that shareholder activism is at its very
beginnings, and that we can expect great reforms in the future.
But there are strong reasons to doubt this. First, shareholder
proposals to undo antitakeover provisions largely failed despite
the fact they were backed by the large, institutional sharehold-
ers and were clearly in the interest of shareholders as a class.
That does not bode well for corporate governance reforms that
are more abstract and less clearly linked to potential monetary
returns to shareholders.
Second, the structural advantages that management has to
defeat a shareholder proposal are still a factor that cannot be
overlooked. So long as management has the corporate treasury
at its disposal, shareholders will always face an uphill battle.
Under Delaware law, moreover, if the certificate of incorporation
so provides, shareholder proposals must garner a majority of the
outstanding shares to gain adoption, not just a plurality of the
shares voting in the election.'
Finally, the 1992 amendments to the proxy rules, which are
intended to facilitate shareholder action, are limited in scope.
Basically, these rules simply permit shareholders to communi-
* cate among themselves without having to file a proxy statement
with the SEC. But such communication was taking place rou-
tinely even before the adoption of the new rules.' More radical
reform, such as allowing unregulated solicitation of proxies by
shareholders, subject only to the antifraud rules, was not se-
64. INVESTOR RESPONSEBmxrY RESEARCH CENTER, INC., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
BULL. 7-8 (May/June, 1993).
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 provides:
In the absence of [a specification in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws
on the number of votes that shall be necessary for the transaction of busi-
ness] . . .:
(2) In all matters other than the election of directors, the affirmative
vote of the majority of the shares present in person or represented by proxy
at the meeting and entitled to vote on the subject matter shall be the act of
the stockholders.
66. See 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 41, at 1603 (interview with John
Olson, a securities lawyer at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher in Washington, D.C.).
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riously considered. Furthermore, other statutory provisions and
SEC rules-such as provisions and rules that discourage the
accumulation of blocks of stock in excess of ten percent, rules
that limit joint action outside of the proxy rules, and rules that
limit shareholder access to proxy statements for the purpose of
nominating directors-have the cumulative effect of discouraging
reform initiated by shareholders. 7
C. The Lost Promise of the ALI
Responding to a growing concern in the law of corporate
governance,' the American Law Institute authorized a thor-
ough reexamination of the subject in 1978. This massive under-
taking, which concluded at the Institute's 1992 annual meeting,
resulted in a large and impressive document entitled Principles
of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations (ALI
Principles). But this project neither satisfied the aspirations of
those seeking reform of corporate governance, 9 nor realized the
fears of those dreading it.70
67. For a discussion of these and other such factors, see Bernard S. Black,
Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 811 (1992).
68. See Donald E. Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 545 (1984) (history of the corporate governance movement and the factors that
prompted the ALI project).
69. The late Professor Donald E. Schwartz, a leading corporate law scholar of
the 1970s and 1980s and a proponent of federal intervention in corporate gover-
nance, see, e.g., Donald E. Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations,
31 Bus. LAw. 1125 (1976), was typical of those who regarded the ALI project with
optimism: "Although it is far from complete, I believe that the American Law
Institute's [corporate governance] project affords the best prospect for achievable re-
form." Schwartz, supra note 68, at 587.
70. The Business Roundtable, which consists of approximately 200 chief exec-
utives of large U.S. corporations, was highly critical of the early efforts of the pro-
ject:
Fundamentally, the proposed Restatement represents an attempt to impose an
additional and unnecessary layer of regulation on United States corporations.
Ignoring the realities of competition and the marketplace, the Reporters ap-
pear intent on setting forth rules on exactly how corporate beards should be
structured . . . and what functions corporate beards should perform.
See Joel Seligman, A Sheep in Wolfs Clothing: The American Law Institute Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance Project, 55 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 325, 325-27 (1987)
(quoting Statement of The Business Roundtable on the American Law Institute's
Proposed "Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Restatement and Rec-
[Vol. 45:3:78300
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To quote one prominent scholar, the ALI Principles "largely
restate] and clarifly] existing cases and statutes, making only
occasional, incremental proposals to change the law."7' This
observation was published in 1987 and was based on earlier
drafts of the ALI Principles. But subsequent drafts, if anything,
have tended to be even less ambitious.72 As the project reached
its conclusion, for instance, the derivative litigation section un-
derwent an important amendment, the effect of which was to
make it more difficult for plaintiffs to maintain such actions."
The most significant achievement of the ALI Principles, in the
end, may be its scholarship-a comprehensive source of fiduciary
duties that can be consulted by courts and practitioners.74
D. Federal Involvement
The near void in corporate governance standards that state
law has created has not been filled by the federal government.
Although Congress surely has the power to implement corporate
ommendation" 33 (Feb. 1983)) (discussing criticisms of the project).
71. Seligman, supra note 70, at 380.
72. See, e.g., Charles Hansen, The Duty of Care, the Business Judgment Rule,
and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 48 Bus. LAW. 1355,
1374-76 (1993) (describing the dilution of the business judgment rule over the course
of the project).
73. See Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in
Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1339, 1370-84
(1993). The last-minute amendment to § 7.04(a) of the final draft, which was dubbed
the "Smith Amendment" at the 1992 annual meeting, was a compromise proposed by
the corporate defense bar and accepted by the Reporters to avoid defeat of the
section and, possibly, the whole project. To those present at the meeting, the Report-
ers obviously acquiesced with some misgivings. See Richard B. Smith, An Underview
of the Principles of Corporate Governance, 48 Bus. LAW. 1297, 1308-11 (1993) (de-
scribing the compromise).
Professor Coffee summarized the ALl Principles on derivative litigation: "Far
from a radical or bold new reform package, Part VII [Derivative Litigation] basically
keeps alive the ffickering possibility of judicial oversight of fiduciary duties in the
corporate context.' John C. Coffee, Jr., New Myths and Old Realities: The American
Law Institute Faces the Derivative Action, 48 Bus. LAw. 1407, 1439 (1993). But see
Dennis J. Block et al., Derivative Litigation: Current Law Versus The American Law
Institute, 48 Bus. LAw. 1443 (1993) (arguing that the ALI Principles have made the
derivative litigation more accessible and attractive to plaintiffs).
74. At least this is how Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., one of the Reporters on
the project, modestly characterized the results. John C. Coffee, Jr., The AL! Corpo-
rate Governance Project, N.Y.L.J., June 9, 1992, at 1.
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governance reforms for business corporations engaged in inter-
state commerce,7 and it has often been urged to do so,76 it has
thus far resisted the temptation. For the most part, Congress
has restricted its involvement in corporate governance to a few
governance issues in regulated industries.77 For instance, under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, no more than sixty per-
cent of the directors of an investment company can be "inter-
ested persons," as defined in the Act, subject to certain excep-
tions.78 Similarly, under the National Bank Act, individuals
who are affiliated with securities firms are prohibited from being
directors of member banks, subject to the authority of the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to provide limited
exceptions.79 In each of these instances, and a few others,"
Congress reacted to identified problems in particularly sensitive
industries.
Outside of the instances noted above, congressional involve-
ment in corporate governance has been limited. Indeed, even the
federal legislation most likely to reach governance issues of
publicly held corporations, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(the Exchange Act), has no such purpose.8' Any doubt on this
75. See Schwartz, supra note 68, at 571.
76. A number of serious proposals have been made: RALPH NADER ET AL,
TAMING THE CORPORATE GIANT (1976); William Cary, Federalism and Corporation
Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Donald E. Schwartz, A
Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAw. 1125 (1976). At least one
bill has been introduced in Congress. S. 2567, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (intro-
duced by Ohio Senator Metzenbaughm).
77. See Schwartz, supra note 68, at 558-71.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10 (1988). The definition of "interested person" is set forth
in § 2(19) of the Act.
79. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
80. In response to disclosures that many publicly held corporations had made
illegal corporate campaign contributions and improper payments to foreign govern-
ments to obtain business, Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in
1977. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(bX2)-(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1982). This law, like others
that might be noted, indirectly affected corporate governance. Among other things,
the Act required covered corporations to maintain accurate accounting records and
implement internal financial controls. The latter requirement helped encourage corpo-
rations to create independent audit committees on their boards of directors. The
Commission played an instrumental role in bringing to light the abuses that led to
the legislation. SECURMTIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE
ILLEGAL PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES, SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE BANKING, HOUSING
AND URBAN AFFAIRS COMM., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (May 12, 1976).
81. The CONFERENCE REPORT TO THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, H.R.
802 [Vol. 45:3:783
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was settled in the D.C. Circuit Court's 1990 decision in Business
Roundtable v. Securities Exchange Commission,82 which in-
volved the SEC's controversial attempt to legislate a one-share,
one-vote rule.'
The Commission action that gave rise to the litigation was
the adoption in 1988 of rule 19(c)-4, barring self-regulatory orga-
nizations (national securities exchanges and national securities
associations) from listing stock of a corporation that takes any
corporate action "with the effect of nullifying, restricting or dis-
parately reducing the per share voting rights of [existing com-
mon stockholders]."" The Business Roundtable' challenged
the rule on the theory that the Commission acted beyond its
authority, and the circuit court agreed. In its well-reasoned
opinion, the court made clear that the Commission had no free-
wheeling power under the Exchange Act to implement its no-
tions of corporate governance. The Commission's argument that
it had such authority under section 14, which allows it to adopt
rules regulating the solicitation of proxies, was flatly rejected by
the court: "[Ilt is not seriously disputed that Congress's central
concern [in enacting section 14] was with disclosure. " '
What is particularly significant about the Business
Roundtable decision is that section 14 was the Commission's
REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1934), contains the following passage:
The House bill does not contain a provision corresponding to that contained in
subsection (d) of section 13 of the Senate amendment providing that "nothing
in this title shall be construed as authorizing the Commission to interfere
with the management of the affairs of an issuer." This provision is omitted
from the substitute as unnecessary, since it is not believed that the bill is
open to misconstruction in the respect.
See also S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1934) (denying that the Exchange
Act contained any intention to interfere with the management of corporations).
82. 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
83. In an attempt to discourage a hostile takeover, some companies adopted
differential voting plans that, in effect, reduced the voting power of shares acquired
by corporate raiders. See Cox ET AL., supra note 58, at 918-19.
84. Voting Rights Listing Standards; Disenfranchisement Rule, 53 Fed. Reg.
26,376, 26,394 (1988) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4(a) (1993)).
85. The Business Roundtable is an organization consisting of the CEOs of the
nation's 200 largest corporations.
86. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410 (citing J.L Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 431 (1964)) ("The purpose of § 14(a) is to prevent management or others
from obtaining authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inade-
quate disclosure in proxy solicitation.").
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best hope for the authority to effect corporate governance. In-
deed, in its opinion, the court questioned one of the SEC's sec-
tion 14 rules (rule 14a-4(b)(2)) that arguably crosses the line
from regulation of the process of proxy solicitation, which is
within its section 14 authority, to the substance of corporate
governance."' Rule 14a-4(b)(2) itself is quite innocent; it simply
requires that the form of proxy provide a means for the person
whose proxy is solicited to withhold the authority to vote for any
nominee.8
In light of its limited authority under the Exchange Act, the
Commission has sought to influence corporate governance indi-
rectly, through disclosure and accounting rules. For instance, it
has adopted rule 13e-3, requiring increased disclosure in going
private transactions, and recently amended its proxy disclosure
rules on executive compensation.
To the extent that the Commission sought to influence the
substantive problems that gave rise to these rules, e.g., abusive
going private transactions or excessive executive compensation,
the rules have not been effective. To the extent the Commission
sought to increase disclosure in each of these areas, it probably
has succeeded, but lack of disclosure was not the problem that
prompted the rule in the first instance.
1. Rule 13e-3.-The Commission adopted rule 13e-3 in 1979
in response to widespread publicity concerning "round-trip"
financings: several of the companies that went public during the
"go-go" years of the late-1960s' were reacquiring their out-
standing common stock at a fraction of the initial public offering
price in "going private" transactions." When this matter came
87. Id. at 411 ("Rule 14a-4(bX2) may lie in a murky area between substance
and procedure.").
88. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(bX2) (1993). The court noted the implicit substantive
effect of the rule: "It thus bars a kind of electoral tying arrangement, and may be
supportable as a control over management's power to set the voting agenda, or,
slightly more broadly, voting procedures," Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411
(citing DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 38-58 (1979)).
89. For an interesting and informative account of this period, see J. BROOKS,
THE GO-Go YEARS (1973).
90. A "going private" transaction can take many forms. The simplest technique
is an issuer tender offer that succeeds in acquiring enough shares from enough
shareholders to cause the issuer to be delisted from a national securities exchange
and, under SEC rules, to cease to be subject to SEC reporting requirements. Follow-
ing this issuer tender offer, or independent of it, management of the issuer going
904 [Vol. 45:3:783
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before the Commission, one option under consideration was to
require that the price paid to the shareholders be "fair."9' This
option met with considerable opposition, and ultimately the
Commission opted for a rule that simply required issuers engag-
ing in going private transactions to disclose whether the
transaction was "fair" to the shareholders.'
If the rule was intended to restrain these transactions (and
the genesis of the rule was a dissatisfaction with- the occurrence
of these transactions, not the lack of disclosure about them),'
it was not a success. In the decade that followed the adoption of
the rule, these transactions continued, increasing in number and
size. However, "round-trips" were not so much the problem;
management-led leveraged buyouts (LBOs) were."4 The proto-
typic going private transaction of the 1980s involved companies
that, in some instances, had been public for decades. And fueled
by the availability of "junk bonds," the LBOs of the 1980s were
larger and more numerous than the round-trippers of the
private might engineer a "squeeze-out" merger, in which the shares of the public
shareholders are converted to cash, debt instruments, or other nonequity securities
in connection with a statutory merger with a corporation controlled by management.
For a fuller description of these techniques, see Gregory L. Schwartz, Comment,
Regulation of Leveraged Buyouts to Protect the Public Shareholders and Enhance the
Corporate Image, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 489 (1986) and authorities cited therein.
91. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-14185, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090 (proposed Nov.
17, 1977) (proposing that going private transactions be procedurally and substantive-
ly fair to the public shareholders).
92. Schedule 13E-3, item 8(a) requires the following disclosure: "State whether
the issuer or affiliate filing this schedule reasonably believes that the Rule 13e-3
transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security holders." 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-100
(1993). This rule, perhaps predictably, has given rise to a new line of business for
investment bankers-"made to order fairness opinions"-that serve the interest of
managers purchasing the company and not public shareholders. Dale A. Oesterle &
Jon R. Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Shareholder
Wealth?, 41 VAND. L. REv. 207, 214 (1988).
93. Many trace the Commission's interest to a speech given in 1974 by A.A.
Sommer, then a member of the Commission, who denounced these transactions. AA
Sommer, Jr. 'Going PrivateS: A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, [1974-1975 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,010 (1974).
94. The profits to management in some of these transactions (and the corre-
sponding loss to shareholders) are breathtaking. For example, one of the most
notorious deals involved Metromedia. In mid-1984, it was taken private by its
chairman and controlling stockholder for $1.1 billion and within two years assets of
Metromedia fetched $5.5 billion in a series of separate transactions. For a brief
review of such deals, see James R. Repetti, Management Buyouts, Efficient Markets,
Fair Value, and Soft Information, 67 N.C. L. REV. 121, 121-22 (1988).
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The reason that going private transactions came under the
scrutiny of the Commission was the perceived unfairness to
shareholders. The transactions were structured in such a way
that shareholders had little choice in the matter; they could
either accept the price offered to them or seek a state appraisal
remedy. They could not choose to remain shareholders in a pub-
licly held corporation. That choice had been made for them by
the board of directors, who seemed to have elevated the interests
of incumbent management over the interests of the public share-
holders.
To the surprise of many, the Delaware Supreme Court re-
acted to this perceived unfairness. In its 1977 decision of Singer
v. Magnovox,' the court held that a corporation engaging in a
going private transaction had to establish some independent
business purpose for the transaction. Otherwise, the transaction
could be enjoined. Since most of the going private transactions
lacked any such purpose, the Delaware decision foreshadowed
what could have been the end of the phenomenon. The
Commission's action, two years later, increased, if only margin-
ally, the disincentives for undertaking these deals. But only four
years after the adoption of rule 13e-3, the Delaware court re-
versed itself, abandoning the business purpose test in
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.1
7
The Delaware court did not indicate that federal involve-
ment in this area, in the form of an SEC rule, mooted the neces-
sity of its recently adopted business purpose test. But surely the
intervening rule made it easier for the court to abandon the test.
95. The number of public firm buyouts increased fairly consistently throughout
the 1980s, from 13 in 1980 to 125 in 1988. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL 1.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATION LAW 113 (1991). Concern over
this new round of going private transactions was as great as the concern in the
1970s, and again SEC commissioners were among the critics. See BEvIS
LONGSTRETH, MANAGEMENT BUYOUTs: ARE PUBLIC SHAREHOLDERS GETTING A FAIR
DEAL? 17 (Oct. 6, 1983) (remarks to the International Bar Association published by
the SEC) ("We see with increasing frequency the spectacle of a conflicted manage-
ment surrounding itself with procedural shields to defend a deal widely believed to
be substantively unfair to shareholders. Such behavior is threatening to tarnish the
image of our corporate community-to give corporate fiduciaries a bad name.")
(quoted in Schwartz, supra note 90, at 490 n.3).
96. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
97. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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And the result was that a state-adopted substantive test was
replaced by a federally promulgated disclosure rule. Sharehold-
ers were the losers. More importantly, many looked with skepti-
cism on the way that corporate directors were discharging their
fiduciary duties. In some instances, the board was favoring man-
agement offers to take the company private over the higher
offers of third parties."
2. Executive Compensation.-The Commission's involvement
in executive compensation is similar to its involvement in going
private transactions. Throughout the 1980s, executive compensa-
tion (particularly CEO compensation) increased at an alarming
rate." This increase could not be explained by the usual fac-
tors: increased demand or decreased supply of qualified execu-
tives; inflation; improved corporate performance; or competition
from abroad for U.S. executives. Indeed, studies seemed to indi-
cate that there is no relationship between CEO compensation
and corporate performance."o United States CEOs were out-
earning, although not out-performing, their Japanese and Ger-
man counterparts by a large margin.'' The explanation, like
the explanation for the presence of going private transactions,
seemed to rest with the board of directors. Something was
amiss; directors seemed to be favoring management at the ex-
pense of shareholders.
Following a public outcry over the size of executive compen-
sation, the Commission reacted in 1992 by adopting a rule that
98. See, e.g., Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch.
1988) (discussed in Mark J. Loewenstein, Book Rev., 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 135, 140-
41 (1990)).
99. Average CEO compensation increased by more than 200% during the 1980s,
while the pay of the average worker increased only about 50%. James E. Heard,
Shareholders Focus Concerns on Executive Compensation at 1992 Annual Meetings,
P.H. L. & Bus. 1 (June 1992).
100. See, e.g., Graef S. Crystal, The Great CEO Pay Sweepstakes, FORTUNE, June
18, 1990, at 94-102. But see Wilbur G. Lewellen et al., Executive Compensation and
the Performance of the Firm, 13 MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECON. 65 (1992) (sug-
gesting that executive pay is linked to corporate performance).
101. See The SEC and the Issue of Runaway Executive Compensation Pay: Hear-
ing Before the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management of the
Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate, 102d Cong., 1st Seass.
(1991); What Do Japanese CEOs Really Make?, Bus. W&,, Apr. 26, 1993, at 60-61.
While the ratio of the average pay of U.S. CEOs to U.S. workers is 100:1, the
comparable ratio in Japan and Western Europe is 15:1 and 25:1, respectively. Heard,
supra note 99, at 1.
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required increased disclosure of executive compensation in the
annual proxy statement.'" It seemed that following the adop-
tion of the rule, executive compensation actually (though surely
coincidentally) increased."° And one can only wonder whether
Commission involvement in this area, or whether Commission
involvement in the going private area, actually stifled or de-
terred further state action. In any event, both of these examples,
like the abuses that encouraged the Commission to adopt rule
19(c)-4, stem from a shortcoming on the board of directors, a
shortcoming the Commission has been able to address only indi-
rectly, and only ineffectively.
E. A Response to the Skeptics
While criticism of corporate governance is by no means a
recent phenomenon,"M it took on new urgency in the 1970s
with the disclosures of illegal corporate campaign contributions
and improper foreign payments. These disclosures, in turn, came
on the heels of an influential study by Harvard Business School
Professor Myles Mace, who suspected it was a myth that corpo-
rate boards manage the business and affairs of their corpora-
tions. ' 5 Mace's anthropological-type work concluded that the
board was not a meaningful check on the corporate CEO; that
boards were passive, rather than active, overseers of the corpo-
ration; and that, except in crisis situations, boards did not even
select the CEO.'
These and other developments' 7 resulted in calls for re-
102. Securities Act Release No. 33-6962, 17 C.F.R. § 228 (1992). The new rules
amend the disclosure requirements set forth in Regulation S-K. E.g., regulation S-K.,
item 402(aX2). Corrections to these rules were announced in Securities Act Release
No. 33-6966, 17 C.F.R. § 228 (1992). Congress also passed, as part of the 1993
Deficit Reduction Bill, a severe limit on the deducibility of executive compensation in
excess of $1 million annually, unless such compensation is tied to corporate perfor-
mance goals established by an independent compensation committee and approved by
the shareholders.
103. Joann S. Lublin, Higher Profits Fatten CEO Bonuses, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21,
1993, at R1.
104. Some of the history is recounted in Schwartz, supra note 68, at 547-51.
105. MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTOR S: MYTH AND REALITY 8 (1971).
106. Professor Mace's work was confirmed in a recent study. See LORSCH, supra
note 5.
107. The Penn Central bankruptcy in 1970 and later disclosures of the ineptitude
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form from influential circles."° But these calls were ignored as
public attention shifted from shortcomings within the boardroom
to attacks from outside. The takeover phenomenon gained steam
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, reaching its peak in 1988. In
that year there were 198 tender offers in excess of $1 million
each, with a total value of almost $154 billion. Of these, fifty-
nine, or thirty percent were contested. As takeovers increased, it
became popular to believe that "the market"--that is, the mar-
ket for corporate control-had solved the problem of inefficiency
in corporate management. If a corporation were poorly managed,
surely someone would come along and exploit the bargain. By
the end of the 1980s, a number of factors converged to strangle
this newly developed market. Credit was more difficult to obtain
as the "junk bond" market contracted, and state antitakeover
laws, together with poison pills and other defensive maneuvers,
made hostile takeovers less attractive and more expensive. By
1991, the number of tender offers with a value in excess of $1
million had declined to twenty-three, with a combined value of
$14.2 billion. Of these, only four were contested and of those
four only one was completed. In the aftermath, as noted above,
corporate boards were more insulated than before.
Against this backdrop, some academics would still urge a
hands-off approach. The leading proponents of this position,
Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel, in their
recent book, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law,' ar-
gue that regulators should not interfere with the terms of corpo-
rate governance. In their view, entrepreneurs have the right
incentives to choose those terms of corporate governance that
will help the firm maximize its ability to raise capital because
"better terms" of corporate governance will help attract capital.
"[T]he firms that pick the wrong terms will fail in competition
with other firms competing for capital."1 A bit later, the au-
thors lay down this challenge: "Unless the person challenging
of its board were also factors in the movement to increase standards of corporate
governance. See Joel Seligman, Symposium, Issue in Corporate Governance: Introduc-
tion, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1, 1-2 (1988).
108. See supra note 76.
109. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
110. Id. at 17.
1994] 809
Alabama Law Review [Vol. 45:3:783
the portion of the corporate contract can make a convincing
argument that the consequences of the term could not have been
appreciated by investors and priced efficiently, there is no rea-
son for intervening to correct a mistake.""' This theory and
this challenge deserve some response. If Messrs. Easterbrook
and Fischel are right, then, indeed, the SEC and the states
should refrain from any regulation in this area.
But there is reason to doubt the wisdom of their theory and
the relevance of their challenge. The people who fix the terms of
corporate governance, at least in the large, mature corporations
that are the concern of this Article, have other incentives than
to maximize the firm's ability to raise capital-namely, to retain
and enhance their positions within the firm, even if the policies
they choose adversely affect the firm's ability to raise capital. If
Easterbrook and Fischel are correct, one would not expect to see
a board of directors implement a poison pill that it knows, ex
ante, is disfavored by investors and adversely affects its stock
price."' On the other hand, one would expect to see a board of
directors propose capital enhancing devices, such as some limita-
tions on management-initiated leveraged buyouts. Such limita-
tions could be structured in such a way that would make an
111. Id. at 31. One may challenge the legitimacy of the question. In proposing a
different way to conceptualize the private corporation, not as the nexus of contracts
as Easterbrook and Fischel (and many others) suggest, but as an "organic institu-
tion" that is more political in nature, Professor Lynne Dallas would reject the
appropriateness of the challenge quoted in the text:
Because the power model [Dallas's conceptualization of the firm] rejects the
efficiency model's presumption that existing control arrangements are efficient,
the important questions to ask in connection with any corporate or market
phenomena become who benefits and who loses or, in terms of efficiency, "effi-
cient for whom?" and "at what costs to others?" Governments are justified in
asking these questions and reaching conclusions. The burden is not on govern-
ments to justify their conclusions, as the efficiency theorists argue, but on those
opposing them, because what exists in the private sector is not necessarily more
efficient from a societal perspective.
Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22
MICH. J.L. REF. 19, 26-27 (1988) (emphasis added).
112. The authors summarize the data:
Firms that adopt antitakeover devices (more neutrally, devices that give in-
cumbent managers the authority to accept or reject bids) experience immediate
reductions in the price of their stock ....
Poison pill securities, the principal device that may be used without
investors' assent, produce a loss averaging 0.34 percent.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 109, at 196.
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equity investment in the company more attractive by giving
public investors the assurance that they will not be cashed out
(and chased out) if there is a general stock market decline. But
just the opposite is taking place. Poison *pills are routinely
adopted without shareholder approval and limitations on man-
agement-led leveraged buyouts are rare, if they exist at all. In
short, there is not active competition in the terms of corporate
governance because the suppliers have more to lose from that
competition than they have to gain.
Consider Corporation A, a large New York Stock Exchange
corporation which has been losing its market share in widgets to
foreign and domestic competition. Analysts believe the firm has
been too slow to adapt to changes in consumer taste and to mod-
ern manufacturing methods. This, in turn, may be attributable
to a disengaged board of directors that has relied too heavily on
senior management to direct the company. Indeed, like the
boards of many companies, the board of Corporation A is com-
placent and deferential.
Solutions might be found to remedy this familiar scenario.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the market for corporate control was
thought to provide a solution, as hostile tender offers at times
displaced inefficient management. But, as we have seen, this
market is now radically different and does not provide the dis-
cipline that it was hoped it would provide."' In recent years,
we have seen two other purported solutions emerge. One has
been that boards of directors have done what they were sup-
posed to do: replace inefficient management."4 The other has
been that the large, institutional managers have become activat-
ed, pressing for changes in management or policy when that
seemed to be in the best interest of the long-term growth of the
corporation. But both of these solutions suffer from being crisis
responses. Before the board has acted, or the institutional man-
113. See generally Joseph Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for
Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REv. 857, 862 (1993) (arguing
that the "market" has lost its effectiveness); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the
Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (articulating the concept
of the market for corporate control for the first time).
114. This has been the case in a few high-profile, low achieving corporations,
including IBM, General Motors, American Express, and Westinghouse Electric in late
1992 and early 1993. Unfortunately for the shareholders of these and other under-
performing companies, a replacement of the CEO may be too little too late.
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agers have become involved, a great deal of damage has already
taken place. The well-documented declines of General Motors
and IBM, just to name a pair of prominent examples, demon-
strate both how a failure of corporate governance can persist for
a long time and how a solution can emerge only after the dam-
age has taken place.
Against this background, it seems that tinkering with corpo-
rate governance cannot be harmful and holds the potential of
improvement. Moreover, the recommendation of this Article,
explored more fully in the next section, is both limited and non-
compulsory.
III. THE CARROT APPROACH: USING RULEMAKING
AUTHORITY UNDER THE 1933 ACT
Seasoned issuers seeking to raise capital in public offerings
have had the advantages, as a result of Commission action, of
using a simplified form of registration and more flexibility than
first-time issuers in issuing securities after registration. The
information required by registration Form S-3, which is avail-
able only to publicly held companies meeting certain tests,"5 is
easier to gather and less expensive to present than that neces-
sary for Form S-1. Similarly, Commission rule 415 allows large,
publicly held companies to file a registration statement (on Form
S-3) and then, in lieu of immediately offering those securities for
sale in accordance with normal procedures, these companies are
permitted to place the registered securities "on the shelf' to be
issued when conditions seem most favorable."1
6
The use of Form S-3 and rule 415 have greatly assisted
public companies in raising new equity and debt."1 Rule 415
115. Among other things, the registrant must have a class of securities registered
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and cannot have defaulted since the end
of the last fiscal year on (a) any dividend or sinking fund installment on preferred
stock, or (b) on any installment on indebtedness for borrowed money, or (c) on any
rental on any material long term leases.
116. Securities Act Release No. 6499, 48 Fed. Reg. 52,889 (Nov. 17, 1983).
117. In adopting rule 415 following a trial period, the Commission concluded that
the temporary rule "has operated efficiently and has provided registrants with
important benefits in their financings, most notably cost savings." Id. See also
Barbara A. Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets and Shelf Registration: An
Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 149-55 (1984) (citing studies that demon-
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has enabled issuers to avoid having to prepare new registration
statements each time they wish to access the public markets,
with the result that issuers can move quickly to take advantage
of, say, a decline in interest rates by issuing debt securities. The
Commission has not sought to limit the availability of rule 415
to issuers with independent boards. But it is the thesis of this
Article that the Commission should be given clear rulemaking
authority, that, among other things, would allow it to limit the
use of forms and rules, like Form S-3 and rule 415, to issuers
with independent boards of directors.
Simplified access to the securities markets is based on the
premise that less regulation is needed to protect investors. Yet
when a corporation maintains a board of directors that is inde-
pendent of management and thus better able, for instance, to
monitor management and determine executive compensation,
then arguably the securities laws should recognize this form of
self-regulation. Everything else being equal, the securities of
such issuers pose less of a risk to investors than securities of
issuers without an independent board. Indeed, in reaction to a
lack of investor confidence, and in an apparent attempt to en-
hance its image in the financial markets, the board of IBM re-
cently announced that it was creating a new committee of out-
side directors to focus on corporate governance. The committee
will nominate new directors, handle shareholder proposals, and
oversee the board's power structure.118 The direction being tak-
en by the IBM board is remarkable because it is unique; few
other boards focus on issues of corporate governance.1 9 Thus,
what may be needed here is a carrot to encourage other corpora-
tions to take the step taken by the IBM board.
The risks of this proposal are small. Conceivably, indepen-
dent boards would be less effective than boards that lack inde-
pendence. But if that is true as a general proposition, then one
might question our whole structure of corporate governance;
maybe boards should be done away with entirely, leaving to
management the task of overseeing itself. To state the proposi-
strate the efficacy of the rule).
118. Michael W. Miller, IBM Overhauling Its Board, Will Create 'Governance"




tion is to demonstrate its obvious weakness, for without a board
of directors, shareholders would have to appoint corporate offi-
cers, monitor their performance, and fix their compensation,
tasks that shareholders are ill-equipped to perform. In short, the
realistic alternatives to an institution to oversee management of
a publicly held corporation are nonexistent. Further, the benefits
of such oversight can only be enhanced if the overseers are inde-
pendent of the overseen.
The question of what constitutes an independent board of
directors could be determined in appropriate rulemaking pro-
ceedings. I recommend that such a rule focus, at a minimum, on
the permissible relationships, both financial and social, between
the directors and management; whether a board can be indepen-
dent of management if the chair of the board of directors is an
officer of the corporation; the extent to which officers and em-
ployees of the corporation can serve at all on the board; the
access to information and the staff support that nonemployee
directors ought to receive; and the composition of the nominating
committee.
The ALI, in its Principles of Corporate Governance, has
dealt with these questions, but its conclusions might be ques-
tioned. For instance, the ALI concluded that the board of direc-
tors of a large publicly held corporation should consist of a ma-
jority of directors who are free of any significant relationship
with the corporation's senior executives. 2 ° One might wonder
how independent this board can be if its chair and several of its
members speak with one voice. In their comments, the reporters
rationalize including senior executives on the board because the
presence of senior executives "ensures knowledgeable and de-
tailed board discussion about the business, and encourages man-
agement to take important issues to the board.""' But board
membership is not necessary to achieve either of these goals.
Certainly management can (and, indeed, should) be encouraged
to bring issues of importance to the board, and invited to attend
board meetings and participate in the discussions. But member-
120. The Principles of Corporate Governance define the terms "large publicly held
corporation," "significant relationship," and "senior executive" in sections 1.24, 1.34,
and 1.33, respectively. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1992).
121. Id. § 3A.01 cmt. C.
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ship on the board may, in some instances, make it awkward for
the rest of the board to have a frank and open discussion on
issues brought by management. Meetings should be structured
so that decisions are made after management participation to
assure that, to the extent possible, directors feel free to exercise
their best judgment.
The Reporters recognized this distinction between member-
ship and participation in section 3A.04, which recommends that
large publicly held corporations have nominating committees
composed exclusively of directors who are not officers or employ-
ees of the corporation." In their comments to this section, the
reporters explain that while officers and employees are disquali-
fied from membership on the nominating committee, they are "in
no way disqualified from playing an active role in the nominat-
ing process."' Indeed, the reporters expect that officers, and
especially the CEO, will play a "highly active" role in nominat-
ing and recruiting board members.' But, presumably, these
same officers are disabled from voting on whom to nominate
because of the importance of independent judgment. The same
analysis would seem to apply to board membership itself.
In sum, this proposal provides an incentive for corporations
to move to truly independent boards and systematically identify
what constitutes independence. Moreover, working through the
Commission, in the context of a rulemaking proceeding, would
allow for a thorough examination of the issue and the flexibility
that may be needed to implement such a rule. Direct Commis-
sion involvement in corporate governance has been resisted and
criticized, but the time may have arrived when such involvement
is appropriate, especially in the limited manner described above.
122. Id. § 3A.04. Section 3A.04 does provide an exception for corporations that
are controlled by a single person, a family group, or a control group. Id.
123. Id. § 3A.04 cmt. C.
124. Id.
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